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Abstract 
Critical discourse analysis has focussed extensively on argumentation in anti-immigration 
discourse where a specific suite of argumentation strategies has been identified as 
constitutive of the discourse.  The successful perlocutionary effects of these arguments are 
analysed as products of pragmatic processes based on ‘common-sense’ reasoning schemes 
known as topoi.  In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation grounded in cognitive-
evolutionary psychology.  Specifically, it is shown that a number of argumentation schemes 
identified as recurrent in anti-immigration discourse relate to two cognitive mechanisms 
proposed in evolutionary psychology: the cheater detection and avoidance mechanism 
(Cosmides 1989) and epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al. 2010).  It is further suggested that 
the potential perlocutionary effects of argument acts in anti-immigration discourse, in 
achieving sanction for discriminatory practices, may arise not as the product of intentional-
inferential processes but as a function of cognitive heuristics and biases provided by these 
mechanisms.  The impact of such arguments may therefore be best characterised in terms 
of manipulation rather than persuasion. 
Keywords: critical discourse analysis, argumentation, manipulation, heuristics, biases, 
immigration, media, cheater detection and avoidance, epistemic vigilance   
 
1.  Introduction  
This paper is an attempt to situate Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with respect to recent 
research in evolutionary psychology (cf. Chilton 2005; O’Halloran 2005; Hart 2010, 2011).  
Specifically, I offer an alternative explanation for the legitimising effects of argument acts 
recurrent in media discourse on immigration which suggests that these acts may be 
successful in reproducing anti-immigration attitudes as a function of evolved heuristics and 
biases in social cognition.  This is an important step forward for CDA where, according to 
Chilton, an evolutionary perspective can “provide an explanatory framework for expanding 
the discussion of issues that CDA is concerned with” (2005: 24).  Chilton (2005), in fact, 
explicitly calls for CDA to consider the contributions that evolutionary psychology can make 
at the explanation stage.  He notes that, in order to fully understand the discursive 
construction of national identity, racism, xenophobia etc., leading to discriminatory social 
practices, we need to pay closer attention to why discriminatory discourse is so effective.  
And this, he suggests, means “taking an explanatory stance rather than a merely descriptive 
one” and “taking account of ideas developed in cognitive and evolutionary psychology” (p. 
24).   These proposals, though, are yet to receive significant uptake in CDA where, as 
O’Halloran observes, “CDA is theoretically eclectic but absent from its theoretical sources is 
biologically-based explanation” (2005: 1945).1  Indeed, despite the potential efficacy of 
evolutionary psychology for CDA, Wodak (2006), for example, chooses to ignore the 
cognitive and evolutionary dimensions of discrimination because “no convincing arguments 
... have yet been brought to light” (2006: 187).  Yet, there is a significant literature in 
evolutionary psychology on the (mal)adaptive nature of discrimination and its cognitive 
underpinnings (e.g. Hirschfeld 1994; Sperber 1994; Schaller et al. 2003; Schaller and 
Neuberg 2008).   
In this paper, then, I seek to connect argumentation in discriminatory discourse with 
discriminatory social practices via adapted cognition.  This is neither a pessimistic nor a 
deterministic position, as will be made clear in section 3.  Rather, understanding why we are 
so quick to form discriminatory judgements based on information acquired in discourse 
offers a further level of critical awareness and thus means of resistance.  In Section 2, I 
outline the standard take on argumentation in the domain of immigration as presented 
predominantly in the discourse-historical approach to CDA.  In Section 3, I highlight recent, 
relevant research on cognitive heuristics and the pragmatics of manipulation.  In Section 4, I 
provide an evolutionary perspective on the impact of specific argument acts discussed 
elsewhere in CDA under the rubric of topoi and fallacies. 
 
2.  Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation 
Argumentation analysis forms part of both the discourse-historical and the socio-cognitive 
approaches to CDA (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Dijk 2000a/b; van Leeuwen and 
Wodak 1999; Wodak 2001; Wodak and Sedlak 2000).  Especially in the discourse-historical 
approach, analysis is conducted against the theoretical background of pragma-dialectics 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992) and in particular the notions of fallacy (e.g. Woods 
1992) and topos (e.g. Kienpointner and Kindt 1994).  Whilst CDA is influenced by pragma-
dialectics, then, the former is concerned with the strategic effects of argument acts from a 
critical standpoint rather than with the effectiveness of argumentation from a normative 
perspective based on an idealised model of the discourse activity (see Ihnen and Richardson 
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2011).  In the discourse-historical approach to CDA, argumentation is one of five discursive 
‘strategies’ involved in positive-Self and negative-Other representation.  By ‘strategy’ it is 
meant a more or less intentional/institutionalised plan of discourse practices, that is, 
systematic ways of using language, which serve to achieve particular social, political, 
psychological or linguistic effects (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44).  Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 
71-80) identify a number of pragmatic fallacies which serve in the justification of 
discrimination.  Among the various fallacies they identify I wish to flag up two in particular: 
ad verecundiam and ad populum.  These two fallacies underpin what van Leeuwen and 
Wodak (1999) refer to as ‘authorisation’ and ‘conformity authorisation’ strategies 
respectively.  They justify discrimination on the basis that a particular course of action is 
right if a certain person or group of persons believes it to be right or if everybody believes it 
to be right.  These strategies are of specific interest, though, for not only do they function to 
justify discrimination directly in deontic expressions but they also give credence to the 
validity of implicitly justificatory propositions and thus serve epistemically to legitimise 
discrimination indirectly (see Hart 2011).  These implicitly justificatory propositions are said 
to belong to topoi.   
The term topos has its roots in classical rhetoric and can be read in one of two ways, either 
as a ‘place’ where arguments can be found or as a pragmatic procedure (van Eemeren et al. 
1996: 38).  It is the latter interpretation that is mainly found in CDA.  For example, Wodak 
defines topoi as content-related warrants which connect premises with conclusions (2001: 
75).  That is, they justify the transition from the premise to the conclusion (ibid.).  A key 
feature of topoi, however, is that they are ‘common-sense’ reasoning schemes typical for 
specific issues (van Dijk 2000b: 98).  The conclusion, therefore, need not be made explicit in 
the argument but may be presupposed to follow from the premise as a rational inference.2  
They are therefore not presented in discourse in the complete logical form of an argument.  
Rather, the argument scheme is invoked by the premise and, in turn, facilitates the 
inferential step toward the presupposed conclusion. Such argument schemes can be 
expressed as conditional statements (Wodak 2001).  To give one example extensively 
employed in anti-immigration discourse, the topos of abuse can be expressed as: “if a right 
or an offer for help is abused, the right should be changed, or the help should be withdrawn, 
or measures against the abuse should be taken” (Wodak 2001: 77).  This topos is 
apprehended in right-wing discourse calling for more restrictive immigration policy based on 
claims that immigrants are exploiting asylum laws and/or welfare systems. 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Wodak (2001) identify a number of topoi which are said to be 
typical of discourse on immigration.  The implicit conclusion in all of these topoi seems to be 
the need for redressive, discriminatory actions restricting the rights and freedoms of 
immigrants and asylum seekers.  A selection of these is presented below (adapted from 
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 Though seemingly rational, of course, the move may in fact be fallacious. 
Wodak 2001: 74).  They are each predicated on an Us/Them dichotomy constructed through 
referential strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). 
- Abuse 
- Burden 
- Disadvantage 
- Displacement 
- Finance 
 
In drawing on pragma-dialectics, the discourse-historical approach characterises the 
perlocutionary effects of these argument acts, if achieved, in terms of persuasion, 
consensus, and the rational resolution of dispute (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 69-71).  The 
audience is explicitly theorised as consciously conceding to the force of the protagonist’s 
argument.  For example, Reisigl and Wodak state that “the speaker’s and hearer’s or 
reader’s ability of rational and logical judgement and conclusion remain the final criteria in 
the intersubjective achievement of an agreement on a controversial point in question” (p. 
70). 
In the socio-cognitive approach, which draws much less on pragma-dialectics, Van Dijk 
prefers to speak of manipulation than persuasion (e.g. 2006).  Defining manipulation and 
distinguishing it from persuasion, however, turns out to be a rather thorny task.  Maillat and 
Oswald (2009) review various possible criteria, including truth, interest, covertness, social 
conditions, and intent, but suggest that none of these are alone necessary nor together 
sufficient to account for what constitutes a manipulative act of communication.   
From the speaker’s point of view, both persuasion and manipulation involve an attempt on 
the part of speaker to influence the judgements, decisions and actions of the audience 
(Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Van Dijk 2006).  However, the distinction is perhaps best captured 
from the perspective of the addressee (Maillat and Oswald 2009).  Here, covertness seems 
to attain a special status, as Maillat and Oswald acknowledge.  Whilst many aspects of 
communication are covert without being manipulative, and whilst manipulation can still 
take place even when the audience is alerted to the manipulative nature of the utterance, 
without making explicit the precise nature of the manipulation, manipulation does 
intuitively at least seem to be dependent on covertness (Maillat and Oswald 2009: 357).  
Indeed, as Maillat and Oswald point out, this intuition is borne out by natural language (p. 
355).  Consider the anomaly in (b) compared to (a): 
(a) Let me persuade you to come to the cinema with me 
(b) Let me manipulate you to come to the cinema with me  
The distinction between persuasion and manipulation, then, seems to lie in (i) the extent to 
which the speech act is explicitly rendered as an argument; and (ii) relatedly, the extent to 
which the speaker’s intention to affect the judgements, decisions and actions of the 
audience is made manifest.  On such an account, topoi are candidates for manipulative acts 
of communication since what is actually expressed is a simple assertion rather than an 
argument.  However, I would like to address a further feature of manipulation which has to 
do with whether the audience reaches a conclusion autonomously through reason or rather 
more automatically through rules.  That is, given information of a certain kind, and in 
specific conditions, can individuals be induced to judge, decide and behave in predictable 
ways based on cognitive heuristics and biases?  And if they can, do unscrupulous speakers 
exploit these tendencies for Machiavellian purposes? 
This would seem to be the position taken by an emerging school of thought in cognitive and 
naturalistic approaches to the pragmatics of manipulation (Chilton 2004; de Saussure and 
Schulz 2005; Hart 2010; Maillat and Oswald 2011).   
 
3.  Cognitive Heuristics 
There has been much work in the psychology of decision-making which suggests that certain 
decisions are made on the basis of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman et al. 
1982).  Heuristics are ‘rules of thumb’ or cognitive ‘shortcuts’.  They are simplification 
strategies which, on the whole, provide efficient and effective guides to solving specific 
kinds of problems.  As generalisations, however, they are fallible and liable to lead to errors 
and biases in particular situations.  It may be that manipulative communication plays on 
these biases.  Indeed, according Maillat and Oswald (2011: 66), “manipulative 
communication is foremost about exploiting the inherently fallible and heuristic-based ways 
in which the human mind processes information”. To give an example, the 
representativeness heuristic leads to biases in categorising objects on the basis of similarity 
to some idealised prototype.  This heuristic may underpin the success of referential 
strategies such as explicit dissimilation discussed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001).  Similarly, the 
fallacy of segundum quid, which is responsible for the formation of stereotypes, may 
operate on a heuristic arising from a “universalising instinct” (Rigotti 2005: 72).  Emotions 
too provide heuristics which guide decisions and actions in useful ways (Cosmides and 
Tooby 2000; Damasio 1994).  Like other heuristics, however, these can lead to errors of 
judgement if misappropriated in certain circumstances (Pinker 1997).  And it may be that 
some discursive strategies are intended to manipulate audiences precisely by stimulating 
affect (Chilton 2004).  In short, then, I am suggesting with Rigotti that “the vices of 
communication are very often misuses of basically positive human exigencies and 
tendencies” (Rigotti 2005: 72).  Indeed, it seems quite reasonable to me to suggest that 
many argumentation strategies might succeed as a direct consequence of otherwise helpful 
cognitive heuristics.   
From an evolutionary perspective, heuristics are cognitive adaptations selected for the 
advantage they brought in ancestral environments.3   They may be responsible for irrational 
decisions in some contemporary contexts but in the environment to which they are tuned 
they proved successful survival strategies.4  One well researched heuristic in evolutionary 
psychology is a cheater detection and avoidance mechanism (Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and 
Tooby 1992).  In top-down approaches to evolutionary psychology researchers make 
testable predictions about the existence of adapted psychological traits based on 
expectations derived from evolutionary theories (Schmitt 2008: 222).  The cheater detection 
and avoidance mechanism, for example, is predicted by the theory of reciprocal altruism.  
Our ancestors lived in relatively stable cooperative coalitions, founded on principles of 
reciprocity, for the long-term selective advantages that such practice conferred (Trivers 
1971).  However, any system of social cooperation is susceptible to exploitation by 
individuals pursuing short-term goals.  The evolution of cooperation amongst humans was 
therefore dependent on a solution to the so-called ‘free rider’ problem, which consists in 
individuals who “take the benefits of social cooperation but do not pay the costs” (Barrett et 
al. 2002: 253).5  Axelrod (1984) showed that the best way to minimise the risk of 
exploitation in a system of social cooperation is for individuals to follow a ‘tit-for-tat’ 
strategy in series of social exchanges.  Tit-for-tat is a general strategy with two rules: 
cooperate in the first instance and on all subsequent occasions repeat partner’s move from 
previous encounter.6  This strategy allows for social cooperation to get a foothold in the first 
place and for it to continue by preventing prolonged exploitation.  The realisation of this 
behavioural strategy, of course, is dependent on underlying cognitive mechanisms.  
Cosmides (1989) and Cosmides and Tooby (1992) suggest that a cheater detection and 
avoidance mechanism must have evolved which embodies the rules of tit-for-tat.  They use 
the Wason selection task as evidence for the existence and domain-specific functionality of 
such a mechanism.  In the Wason selection task participants are tasked with testing whether 
a conditional rule of the underlying form if P then Q has been violated.  In two conditions, 
participants are presented with four cards on the face of which are values corresponding 
with P, ~P, Q and ~Q.  On the reverse of P cards are Q values and on the reverse of Q cards 
are P values.  Presented with the problem in a purely logical condition only 25% of 
participants correctly identify that to test whether or not the rule has been broken one 
needs to turn over cards corresponding with P and ~Q.  Presented in a social contract 
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scenario, however, 75% of participants successfully solve the problem.  Cosmides and Tooby 
claim that this differential is a function of a context-sensitive mechanism adapted to 
manage the social contracts on which cooperative living relies.  
If social contracts are found to have been infringed, the mechanism is adapted to promote 
decisions concerning future cooperation which reflect the second rule in tit-for-tat, namely 
withdraw from further cooperative engagements with guilty individuals.  The mechanism for 
managing social contracts, then, must include at least (i) a heuristic that can detect cheaters 
(defined as those reneging on a social contract) and (ii) a heuristic that causes one to punish 
cheaters by no longer acting altruistically toward them (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 177). 
The argument I wish to make is that some of the argument acts found in anti-immigration 
discourse may achieve their intended perlocutionary effects by exploiting these heuristics.  
That is, certain argument acts such as those belonging to the topoi listed in Section 2 may 
succeed in yielding decisions in favour of discrimination as a consequence of an adapted 
cheater detection and avoidance mechanism.  Note that this is not a reductionist argument.  
We are not pre-determined to form discriminatory attitudes and there is nothing inevitable 
about social exclusion.  The cheater detection and avoidance mechanism operates only on 
specific input conditions.  What I am suggesting is that in the modern world those conditions 
are met (spuriously) through discourse where many of the argument acts typical of 
discourse on immigration can be shown to provide precisely, either directly or via inter-/co-
textual interaction, the necessary antecedents for the operation of an extant, evolved 
mechanism for cheater detection and avoidance (see Section 4).  In other words, 
discriminatory attitudes arise when argumentation harnesses adapted cognition for 
manipulative purposes.  Laland and Brown make the same point in relation to war as 
follows: 
 Biological predispositions … do not cause war.  However, [they] do play an important 
role as they are exploited, for instance in the propaganda of mobilizing and abusive 
leaders, in ways … that sanctify aggression against adversaries. (2002: 97) 
There is a further important sense in which the argument I am making is not deterministic.  I 
do not wish to suggest that, given an input of a certain kind, hearers cannot help but in all 
circumstances to form discriminatory attitudes.  For example, the audience is free to dismiss 
the antecedent proposition in the topos as untrue (Chilton 2005).  And even when the 
proposition is treated as true, alternative arguments can be called up which would prohibit 
the output of the cheater detection and avoidance mechanism.7  However, there are several 
reasons to think that for some hearers on some occasions the argument acts in anti-
immigration discourse may automatically yield decisions in favour of discrimination.  These 
are outlined in the following.  (1) Given the significance of the free-rider problem in the 
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ancestral environment, the cheater detection and avoidance mechanism, like many other 
adapted mechanisms, may have evolved to operate on a fast and frugal basis and be biased 
toward false-positive errors (Haselton 2007; Haselton and Buss 2003).  (2) Although the 
argument act may be truth-conditionally infelicitous, it may nevertheless receive uptake if it 
is judged as felicitous by hearers.  And speakers have at their disposal a further range of 
argumentation strategies designed specifically to provide epistemic support to their 
testimonies, which themselves may exploit further evolved cognitive biases (Hart 2011).  (3) 
People are biased toward believing propositions which confirm existing beliefs (the 
confirmation bias) (Oswald and Grosjean 2004).  (4) A proposition gains in perceived truth-
status as a consequence of the frequency with which it is repeated (the validity effect) 
(Hacket Renner 2004).  (5) Information which may block the output of the cheater 
avoidance heuristic may not be available to the audience, either because (a) it is not part of 
their existing belief system and is not presented in the discourse or because (b) cognitive 
access to it is somehow hindered (Maillat and Oswald 2011).  
(3), (4) and (5a) relate to macro-level discourse strategies.  For example, the confirmation 
bias and validity effect mean that the systematic exclusion of certain information and the 
frequent inclusion of other information within an order of discourse can lead to the content 
of that discourse becoming a self-fulfilling truth simply by virtue of itself.  The more 
frequently a proposition is encountered, according to the validity effect, the higher the 
truth-value it attains and the higher the truth-value a proposition has, according to the 
confirmation bias, the more likely it and other consonant claims are to go unchallenged on 
subsequent occasions of use.  These two biases may therefore account for the process of 
“naturalisation” often discussed but which remains under-theorised in CDA (e.g. Fairclough 
1989).  
(2) and (5b) relate to micro-level discourse strategies.  For example, in relation to (2) Hart 
(2011) discusses the role of evidentiality in legitimising assertions.  He suggests that 
speakers can use evidentials rhetorically in discourse to increase the credibility of their 
propositional claims.  In relation to (5b), Maillat and Oswald (2011) propose a context-
selection constraint as an integral facet of manipulative communication.   The essence of 
their argument, based in Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), is that manipulative 
speakers are able to take advantage of a “resource-bound efficiency constraint balancing 
cognitive effort and contextual effects” (p. 69) to frame their discourse in such a way as to 
make certain assumptions salient to the point that any conflicting assumptions do not 
satisfy effort-effect relations and so remain inaccessible to hearers, at least at the moment 
of utterance.  Manipulative discourse for Maillat and Oswald, then, involves two 
dimensions: 
on the one hand, it induces the hearer into processing the information in a very 
constrained context of interpretation, and, on the other hand, it simultaneously makes 
sure that the hearer is prevented from expanding the latter, so that further 
assumptions (e.g. about the utterance’s tentative incompatibility with previously held 
beliefs, or about the speaker’s motivations) are not accessed at all. (p. 71) 
In terms of decision-making, this process is manipulative in so far as it exploits an availability 
bias according to which we make decisions based on currently salient information rather 
than taking into account other potentially applicable background assumptions (Reber 2004). 
All of this, anyway, points to the ability of speakers to create discursive contexts in which 
particular propositions can, by virtue of the cheater detection and avoidance mechanism, 
manipulate audiences into programmatically forming anti-immigration attitudes.  In the 
next section, I show that a number of the argument acts recurrent in anti-immigration 
discourse pertain to the violation of a tacit “citizen’s contract” and are therefore strong 
candidates for manipulative acts of communication. 
 
4.  Legitimisation in Light of Cognitive Heuristics 
The various propositions associated with the topoi listed in Section 2 predicate that 
immigrants and asylum seekers are in violation of some tacit social contract of the following 
underlying form: if individuals have access to in-group resources then they should 
contribute in some equitable way to the effectiveness of the in-group.  It is specifically 
instantiated as: if individuals have access to state resources then they should contribute 
economically to the nation.  If taken as true, then, and in the right (restricted) discursive 
contexts, these propositions may provide the necessary antecedents to activate the cheater 
detection and avoidance mechanism and thereby lead audiences, without proper scrutiny, 
to decisions in favour of discriminatory actions.  Propositions providing input to the cheater 
avoidance heuristic, of course, need not be expressed explicitly in discourse but may be 
implied or presupposed.  In this section, I use attested examples taken from a corpus of 
media discourse on immigration to highlight candidate assertions for such acts of 
manipulation.8 
The topoi of burden, finance and displacement all predicate that immigrants and asylum 
seekers draw on state resources. Within the topos of burden, for example, they are 
presented in general terms not just as drawing on state resources but as constituting a 
‘drain’ on those resources.  Consider (1): 
(1) The Sun, 24 Oct. 2003 
 Government insiders say Cabinet chiefs are determined to reduce the drain on the 
nation’s resources from illegal immigration. 
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asylum published across 8 national newspapers between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2006. 
Also within this topos, as in (2), immigrants and asylum seekers may be presented 
specifically as a burden on employment, housing and health services. 
(2) The Sun, 17 Jan. 2003 
 Britain needs to rid itself of these people and in the process end the terrorism threat 
and the drain on our jobs, housing, hospitals ... 
As formulated by Wodak, the topos of burden takes the following structure: “if a person, an 
institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish 
these burdens” (2001: 76).  
The topos of finance can be viewed as a specific instantiation of the topos of burden.  
Within this topos, immigration and asylum is reported in monetary terms as presenting 
some particular cost and as therefore constituting a financial burden to the in-group and in-
group members.  Consider (3): 
(3) Daily Mail, 28 Jan. 2005 
 The cost of uncontrolled immigration into Britain has rocketed to £3billion, the 
equivalent of £140 a year for every household, Michael Howard will warn today.  The 
Tory leader will intensify his drive to put the issue at the centre of the General Election 
campaign by highlighting the financial burden on the taxpayer. 
The topos of finance is characterised by Wodak as: “if a specific situation or action costs too 
much money or causes a loss of revenue, one should perform actions which diminish the 
coasts or help to avoid the loss” (2001: 76). 
Within the topos of displacement, as exemplified in (4) and (5), immigrants and asylum 
seekers are predicated as having privileged access to socio-economic resources ahead of the 
in-group: 
(4) Daily Mail, 10 July 2000 
 Because of the ‘postcode lottery’ this means that asylum seekers almost 80 per cent 
of whose applications to stay are eventually rejected could find themselves ahead of 
Britons in the queue for scarce NHS resources. 
(5) The Times, 27 Jan. 2004 
 Destitute and disable asylum-seekers can jump ahead of Britons in the housing queue 
after the Law Lords dismissed an application by Lambeth Council, south London, to 
challenge an Appeal Court ruling that it was obliged to house a disabled Algerian 
asylum-seeker. 
The topos of displacement is not discussed by Wodak, although it may be related to the 
topos of justice (Wodak 2001: 75). It can be expressed as: if a situation leads to certain 
individuals being privileged over other individuals, action should be taken to redress this 
imbalance. 
The topos of disadvantage (or uselessness) is the reflex of the topos of advantage (or 
usefulness) which is captured by Wodak (2001: 74) as: “if an action or decision is useful or 
bears advantages, then one should perform it”.  The topos of disadvantage, conversely, can 
be expressed as: if an action of decision is not useful or does not bring about advantages, 
then one should not perform it.  Of course, this topos, as appropriated in anti-immigration 
discourse, typically relies on the perspective pro bono nobis (for the good of Us).  In the 
topos of disadvantage, then, it is predicated that immigrants and asylum seekers bring no 
economic benefit or make no worthwhile contribution to the in-group.  Consider (6) and (7): 
(6) The Express, 13 Sept. 2002 
 The majority of asylum-seekers are unlikely ever to contribute to the economy. 
(7) Sunday Times, 8 Feb. 2004 
 [T]hey also add to the pool of unskilled workers, something which Britain does not 
need. 
On the standard account of argumentation offered in CDA, predications in anti-immigration 
discourse are analysed as realisations of the antecedents in these conditional 
argumentation schemes, which, in turn, function as content-warrants justifying the 
pragmatic move to the presupposed conclusion in the consequent.   
However, the antecedents in the topoi of burden, finance and displacement on the one 
hand, and the topos of disadvantage on the other, relate to two sides of the “citizen’s social 
contract”, which, they predicate, immigrants and asylum seekers are in breach of.  On the 
alternative account presented here, it is therefore suggested that (i) assertions realising the 
antecedents in these particular topoi function inter- or co-textually to activate the cheater 
detection and avoidance mechanism; and that (ii) the conclusions in these topoi, as guides 
for action, operationalise the second rule in tit for tat and may thus be analysed as outputs 
of the cheater-detection and avoidance mechanism.  On this account, then, certain topoi, as 
formulated in CDA, may in fact reflect adapted decision rules on the basis of which hearers 
reach conclusions in heuristic rather than reasoned ways.  
One topos which may alone provide the input conditions necessary for the operation of the 
cheater detection and avoidance mechanism is the topos of abuse briefly discussed in 
Section 2.  The topos of abuse entails both the topos of burden and the topos of 
disadvantage (uselessness).  Assertions realising the antecedent in this topos directly 
represent immigrants and asylum seekers as social cheats (as defined above).  This is 
achieved via predications in verb phrases as well as in noun phrases, including metaphorical 
noun phrases.  Consider (8) as a general example: 
(8) The Sun, 23 March 2000 
 These people will contribute nothing towards our economy and the Scottish people 
will find it hard to tolerate a community which takes everything and gives nothing. 
More specifically, it is sometimes predicated that immigrants and asylum seekers abuse 
social security systems as in (9) and (10): 
(9) The Sun, 29 Oct. 2003 
 They will exploit our generous welfare system for every penny they can. 
(10) Daily Mail, 7 March 2000 
 [S]ome supposed asylum seekers repay our generosity by cheating the benefit 
system. 
The antecedent in the topos of abuse is also realised in metaphorical noun phrases, which 
can serve both a referential and a predicational function simultaneously (Reisigl and Wodak 
2001).  For example, biologynyms like those in (11) refer to immigrants and asylum seekers 
as parasitic rather than mutually symbiotic organisms: 
(11) The Sun, 24 July 2003 
 How is it that this asylum sponger, who had the audacity to rent out his free house, 
also receives a weekly giro of £176 when old age couples, who have paid their dues all 
their working lives, only receive £150 between them? […] This must be stopped now 
before our country is sucked dry by these parasites. 
Assertions realising the antecedent in the topos of abuse, then, are themselves, without 
textual interaction, candidates for mobilising the cheater-detection and avoidance 
mechanism in manipulative acts of communication.  
Of course, as we have mentioned in Section 3 and as has been discussed at length 
elsewhere (e.g. Chilton 2005; Hart 2011), hearers can only be manipulated in this way if they 
accept the manipulating assertion as true.  And, as Chilton (2004: 21) points out, “humans 
do not, or do not have to process incoming messages as already true”.  However, there is at 
least a presumption of cooperation and truth in human linguistic communication (Grice 
1975, 1978).  Communication could not have evolved otherwise.  Communication, like any 
other system of cooperation, is thus vulnerable to exploitation, which here takes the form of 
deception, misdirection, exaggeration etc.  In order to sustain the benefits of 
communication, therefore, some mechanisms must have co-evolved which allow hearers to 
monitor incoming messages and filter them according to an assigned truth status.  Sperber 
(2006) and Sperber et al. (2010) therefore propose a suite of mechanisms for “epistemic 
vigilance” which perform precisely this function.  Of course, these mechanisms cannot be 
too overzealous otherwise individuals would lose the significant benefits brought by 
communication.  And, crucially, speakers are able to take advantage of their own safeguards 
in order to satisfy the safeguards of others (Sperber 2006; Sperber 2010).  The system 
therefore still leaves room for audiences to be manipulated by unscrupulous speakers.  
Indeed, according to Sperber (2006: 178), “cognitive manipulation of others is one of the 
effects that makes the practices of testimony and argumentation adaptive”.  Hart (2011) 
analyses expressions of evidentiality in particular as designed to meet the conditions of 
acceptance demanded by epistemic vigilance.  Producers of media discourse, on this 
account, are required to offer reasons why audiences should accept their testimonies if they 
wish to achieve intended perlocutionary effects.  One reason to accept an assertion and 
adapt one’s belief system accordingly is that it appears to be true.  And speakers can use 
arguments from perception, proof and obviousness to provide evidence to this effect (Hart 
2011).  However, there may be other reasons to retain a proposition as part of one’s belief 
system irrespective of truth.  For example, when a child believes their parents’ claims that 
all strangers are dangerous.  Two kinds of evidential are especially relevant in this regard.  
Consider the following examples: 
(12) The Express, 23 Feb. 2005 
 Under Labour, Britain has become a soft touch on asylum and immigration and 
everybody knows it. [quoting shadow Home Secretary, David Davis]  
(13)  The Daily Telegraph, 16 Jan. 2003 
 Everyone can see that the asylum system, whatever the merits of the principle behind 
it, is not working. 
(14) Sunday Times, 20 July 2003 
 Migrationwatch UK, a specialist think tank, says that in the next 20 years one new 
house will have to be built for every four already existing in London, the southeast and 
southwest of England. 
(15) The Guardian, 6 Aug. 2004 
 The government policy of dispersing asylum seekers away from London and the south-
east may increase HIV transmission, medical experts warned last night.  
The rhetorical function of such source-tags is usually explained in CDA in terms of appeal to 
fallacious argument schemes.  For example, (12) and (13) represent conformity 
authorisation strategies based on the fallacy of ad populum whilst (14) and (15) represent 
authorisation strategies based on the fallacy of ad verecundiam (van Leeuwen and Wodak 
1999).  But this begs the question, of course, what makes these fallacies effective in the first 
place?  The answer, I wish to suggest, is that whilst it may be epistemologically fallacious to 
entertain a proposition simply because it is believed by others, to do so may have been a 
sensible strategy for our ancestors which has given rise to a modern conformity bias 
(Henrich and Boyd 1998).  As Sperber et al. (2010: 380) put it: 
If an idea is generally accepted by the people you interact with, isn’t this a good 
reason to accept it too?  It may be a modest and prudent policy to go along with the 
people one interacts with, and to accept the ideas they accept.  Anything else may 
compromise one’s cultural competence and social acceptability. 
The argument from ad populum, then, may succeed in achieving belief-fixation, paving the 
way for further manipulative effects, by virtue of an inherent bias toward the conformity of 
background assumptions.  Arguments from ad verecundium may ultimately succeed on the 
back of the same biases.  For example, assertions from experts tend to achieve salience 
within society and find themselves repeated over and again.  Given the validity effect (see 
Section 3), then, assertions accompanied by arguments from ad verecundium can be 
expected to receive uptake within the target community whence the conformity bias 
underpinning arguments from ad populum comes into effect.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
What I have tried to do in this paper is offer an explanation, from an evolutionary 
perspective, for the cognitive import of specific argument acts presented in anti-
immigration discourse.  This explanation relies on a ‘mapping’ between discursive strategies 
on the one hand and cognitive heuristics and biases on the other.  In line with Maillat and 
Oswald (2009: 360), then, my claim is that “manipulation exploits the way our mechanisms 
of information processing work; that is, a necessarily imperfect and biased way”.  On this 
account, the logically invalid conclusions of particular topoi and other fallacious arguments 
can be reinterpreted as errors and biases which result from cognitive heuristics and other 
natural tendencies and which are mobilised in contexts beyond their proper domain for 
purposes of manipulation.  In particular, I have tried to show how the cheater detection and 
avoidance mechanism as well as systems for epistemic vigilance are exploited in media 
discourse on immigration. 
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